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 Abstract  
In this research paper the main forces that influence different kinds of corporate control of the 
largest firms by country are evaluated. Firms controlled by individuals, Government, 
miscellaneous investors or widely held, exist under different circumstances. While firms 
controlled by individuals are small, proliferate on civil-law based countries with low levels of 
economic freedom, firms controlled by Governments multiply under low standards of 
disclosure, undeveloped financial markets and non catholic environments. On the other hand, 
the presence of miscellaneous investors is more frequent when stocks are glamorous and small 
wherein the smaller shareholder can easily use their limited resources and monitoring the 
management/larger shareholder. Finally, widely held firms are large and are stimulated by an 
economic freedom behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate ownership of the US firms has been characterized as widely held by small 
shareholders, since the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932), where the management plays 
an important role in the control of the firm. This can be explained by several reasons related 
with the legal system and the responsibility of the State on the economy. However, not even all 
countries have the same legal system, the same interventionism of the Government on the 
economy, the same financial infrastructures, the same standards of transparency, the same 
economic history, and consequently the corporate ownership and the characteristics of 
shareholders are diffused around the world. The role of economic history is clearly relevant to 
understand corporate control, for example the Nordic countries historically use dual class 
shares, in Spain, Italy and Austria the mutualism has been protagonist along their history, in 
Turkey and Chile the State protected families and in Denmark foundations plays a decisive role 
in the control of firms. These evidences can´t be ignored to understand how corporate 
ownership is so different around the world. For example, according to the results of Becht and 
Roell (1999) the degree of ownership concentration in the UK and in the USA is smaller than 
in Continental Europe. Faccio and Lang (2002), based on a sample of Western European firms, 
present similar results, that is, there is a large number of widely held firms in the UK and 
Ireland, in comparison to continental Europe. They show that smallest firms and industrial 
firms are more family-owned than financial institutions, and in some countries the State plays a 
decisive role in the largest firms. Claessens et al (2000), using a sample of 2,980 East Asian 
companies from 9 countries, show how firms from that region are largely family-owned, as 
well as how corporate wealth is in the hands of a few families.  
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However, the debate over corporate ownership and the importance of the legal system and 
other country infrastructures is far from ending. While La Porta et al (1999) confirm the idea 
that in countries with higher antidirector rights, namely in the US, wherein investors are well 
protected, the corporate ownership is widely held, on the contrary, countries with low 
shareholder protection, wherein the State interferes in private business, the largest firms are 
more family-owned, the voting rights are separate from the cash flow rights, namely through 
multiple classes of stock, cross-shareholdings, and pyramidal structures, and the ownership is 
less diffused. More recently this assumption has been refused. Holderness (2009), based on a 
sample of 23 countries, refutes the idea that corporate ownership in US firms is more diffused 
than in other countries. His research documents that 96% of the US firms from their sample 
have blockholders with at least 5% of firm’s voting rights. His result contradicts the assumption 
that the stronger US investor protection rights account for the widely held ownership of US 
firms. But the debate concerning corporate ownership around the world is not limited to 
evaluate how concentrated shareholders structures are around the world. For example, La Porta 
et al (1999) analyzing the ultimate firm owners, based on voting rights, assess whether those 
depend on the characteristics of the legal system in 27 countries. Basically they define six types 
of ultimate owners: widely held, family, State, widely held Financial, widely held corporation 
and miscellaneous. In this research paper it will be analyzed, considering different ultimate 
owners – mixed, individuals, Government and widely held -, based on voting rights, which 
variables influence the most each kind of ultimate owner.  
In this research paper we pretend to evaluate which variables, firm or country specific, 
determine the ultimate ownership. Questions like firms being controlled by individuals on 
undeveloped financial markets or firms controlled by the Government subsisting on Catholic 
environments are evaluated.   
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the methodology;. Section 3 
presents the results for the definitions, for the variables and for the regressions. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
2.1.Data 
The data extracted from Factset/Lionshres database includes the ultimate owners of the largest 
firms 20 firms from 31 countries obtained from Worldscope database (Worldscope item, 
WC08001) and respects to the end 2005, more precisely to the period between 2005 and March 
2006, depending on the information supplied by firms. These data were compared with those 
obtained from different 620 firm´s websites. We selected firms from the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the US.  
 
2.2. Methodology 
2.2.1. Definitions of Variables 
2.2.1.1. Dependent variables 
While voting rights determine corporate control, cash flow rights are used to evaluate corporate 
ownership. It is important to distinguish both concepts because they usually present different 
results, particularly when the shareholdings are based on pyramidal structures, a way wherein 
large shareholders obtain control with the least amount of capital. For example, if investor A 
holds 5% of the shares of firm X, and simultaneously 20% of shares of the firm Y, which in its 
turn also owns 10% of firm X, then we may say that A has 7% (5%+20%*10%) of cash flow 
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rights and controls 15% of voting rights (min(10%,20%)+5%). Moreover, differences between 
voting rights and cash flow rights are particularly sensitive to dual class voting shares. For 
example, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., the US holding company managed by Warren Buffet, has 
two classes of common stock, Class A and Class B. A share of Class B common stock has the 
rights of 1/30th of a share of Class A common stock except that a Class B share has 1/200th of 
the voting rights of a Class A share (rather than 1/30th of the vote). Considering that Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc. has issued 1,261 million and 8,407 million Class A and B shares respectively, 
we conclude that the 0,498 million Class A shares owned by Warren Buffet represent 32% of 
cash flow rights and 38% of voting rights. 
In this research, we do not consider some mechanisms used by firms to impede takeovers such 
as voting caps, golden shares, and voting blocks. We have collected only ultimate owners that 
own more than 5% of voting rights of a firm. We define a threshold of 20%, that means if the 
sum of ultimate owners with more than 5% of voting rights does not exceed a threshold of 
20%, we define the corporate ownership of that firm as widely held. These figures are in line 
with recent research, for example, Holderness (2009) and La Porta et al (1999) who chose 5%, 
10%, and 20%, respectively. The blockholder percentage of voting rights takes into account the 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) stakes. There are few examples of shareholders in 
possession of a qualified participation as a result of a simultaneous investment in common 
stocks and ADRs.  
We define the following ultimate owners: 
 Widely Held – a firm without any ultimate owner is defined as widely held, that is, 
when there is no ultimate owner with more than 5% of total voting rights. Such is the 
case of Banco Santander Central Hispano, the largest Spanish bank; 
 Individual - when a given person (or a group of given people) is the sole shareholder 
who controls a significant percentage of voting rights, we define that firm as 
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individually controlled. For example, Great West Lifeco, a Canadian insurance 
company, is owned by Power Financial Corp (74.9% of total voting rights). Power 
Financial Corp, in turn, is owned by Sir Paul Desmarais (66.4% of total voting rights). 
Thus, we can say that Sir Paul Desmarais has 66.4% of total voting rights of Great West 
Lifeco. In these cases we are in the presence of a pyramidal structure. The use of this 
type of strategy has been analyzed and criticized because it is an interesting way for the 
large shareholders, particularly families, to maintain control of a firm and 
simultaneously to expropriate private benefits from minority shareholders (see Almeida 
and Wolfenzon (2006)); 
 Government - when a State is the sole shareholder that controls a significant percentage 
of voting rights, a firm is Government owned. For example, Hafslund ASA, a 
Norwegian electric utility, has two shareholders who own more than 5% of voting 
rights. One is Oslo Kommune, a Norwegian Government institution with 58.5% of total 
voting rights, the other is Fortum Oyj, a Finnish public company with 32.8% of total 
voting rights, whose main shareholder (with more than 5% of voting rights) is the 
Finnish Government with 51.5% of voting rights. Thus, Finnish Government controls 
32.8% of total voting rights of Hafslund ASA;  
 Miscellaneous – whenever a structure differed from the previous, we define it as mixed. 
It is possible to observe such structures when a company is dominated by a number of 
different financial institutions. For example, Fosters Group, an Australian beverages 
firm, has the following shareholders with more than 5% of voting rights: Mondrian 
Investment Partners Ltd with 7.3% (Investment Advisor); Capital Research & 
Management Co with 7.2% (Investment Advisor); Colonial First State Investments Ltd 
with 6.1% of voting rights (Bank Management Division); and, Maple-Brown Abbot Ltd 
with 6% (Investment Advisor). In this case we are in the presence of four financial 
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institutions that own more than 20% of voting rights. But also when the main ultimate 
owners belong to different business areas. For example, PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, 
a telecommunications company in Indonesia, is controlled by the government (51.2% of 
total voting rights), although Capital Research & Management Co also owns 8.8% of 
total voting rights. 
 
2.2.1.2. Independent variables 
To determine which variables influence the most kind of corporate control firm-level 
variables and country-level variables are assessed (see tables I and II): 
Firm level variables 
 Size – We expect a negative relationship between firm size and fraction of corporate 
control, ceteris paribus. Wealth constraints, in addition to risk aversion imply that an 
ultimate owner is less able to accomplish as a firm becomes larger (Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), Prowse (1992) and Holderness (2009)). We use the (natural logarithm) market 
capitalisation, dollar denominated, to control the size of a firm (Worldscope Item, 
WC07211); 
 Volatility - A firm with more volatile profit rate is more difficult to monitor and to 
control, and as a result the level of ownership concentration is expectably higher, in 
order to avoid eventual abuses by management. The results obtained by Prowse (1992) 
for the Japanese market confirm the previous relationship for independent firms, but not 
for keiretsu firms. In fact, not even the expected relationship is found. While Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) find a positive relationship, Himmelberg et al (1999) document a 
negative relationship. Datastream (DS) weekly prices, dollar denominated, were used to 
calculate the annualised standard deviation of weekly stock market rates of return 
during 2000-2005; 
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 Market-to-Book - This variable is seen as a proxy for the growth opportunities of a firm. 
We presume that a firm with more growth opportunities, and also with more doubts by 
investors, would develop easily in a developed capital market. Kahn and Winton (1998) 
and Goergen (1998), show in theoretical and empirical terms respectively, that the 
ownership retention by the initial shareholders will be lower, after an IPO, on firms 
characterised by growth opportunities with need of external finance. Market-to-book is 
defined as total assets (Worldscope Item, WC 02999) minus book equity - defined as 
total assets minus total liabilities (WC 03351) and preferred stock (WC 03451) plus 
deferred taxes (WC 03263) and convertible debt (WC 18282) - plus market 
capitalisation (WC 08001), local currency denominated, divided by total assets. 
Country level variables 
 Legal Environment – Legal country origin is a measure of legal environment. Country 
origin is divided in the two main important legal families, common and civil law 
origins. Civil law origins, on the other hand, produced three variants of law: French, 
German, and Scandinavian legal environment. La Porta et al (1997, 1998) find a 
positive relationship between common law-based countries and capital markets 
development, based on accounting standards, shareholders’ rights and creditors’ rights 
present higher standards. However, this evidence has been denied by recent research 
that found non time series evidence (Rajan and Zingales (2003)). A positive relationship 
between diffuse corporate ownership structures and common law-based countries is 
expected, particularly when management and shareholder are agent and principal, 
respectively  (see La Porta et al (1999)); 
 Corporate Disclosure – We expect that more diffused ownership structures to prevail in 
countries where accounting and financial disclosure presents higher standards (La Porta 
et al (1998)). In fact, in that case it is easier to monitor the management (and large 
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shareholders decisions) and consequently to avoid the expropriation of wealth from 
minority shareholders. However, that relationship must be taken with caution. For 
example, Guedhami and Pittman (2006), for a group of privatised firms from 31 
countries, found weak evidence between ownership concentration and disclosure 
standards.  Disclosure level
1
 is from Bhattacharya et al (2003) and the original source is 
the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR); 
 Private credit – We expect more concentrated corporate ownership structures under an 
environment where financial system is comparatively more developed than the local 
capital market. Shareholders in these cases presumably resist to undertake public offers 
and to share control with others. Private credit is provided by World Bank measured by 
banking sector % of GDP;  
 Religion - Local beliefs produce impacts on different areas of economy. Weber (1905) 
in his distinguished book, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, found 
that Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, was a means of explaining capitalism. In the 
Renaissance period, contrary to Catholic religion which defended a fairly luxurious way 
of life, a group of reformists emerged in the 16th century, namely Martin Luther and 
John Calvin belonging to the Catholic church and who started a religious movement, 
later designated as the Protestant Reformation. Protestants defended that hard work led 
to prosperity and a life without luxury. This asceticism resulted in an accumulation of 
capital, which inspired the beginning of capitalism; 
 Economic Freedom – We expect more diffused corporate control structures under an 
environment of business freedom, financial freedom and freedom from corruption. We 
use the index of economic freedom from Heritage Foundation. 
 
                                                 
1 An índex
 
creted
 
by examiningc the firms’annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items.  
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2.2.2. Multivariate Regressions 
A Logit regression model is used to examine the relationship between the probability of a 
firm's with a specific ultimate owner switch to another one, conditional on a vector of 
explanatory independent X. The dependent variable is 1 for a given class of ultimate owner 
and 0 for the remaining. This relationship can be expressed as following where   
 
 {   | }  
 
    (         )
 
The β′ is the parameter estimated from the sample data for each independent variable and X 
represents the explanatory variables, including market capitalization, market-to book, 
volatility, legal system, disclosure level, private credit, economic freedom and religion. 
 
3. Results 
Table III identifies the number of firms by country, considering the different categories of 
ultimate owners. The results, comparing countries with common and civil legal regimes, 
show that only exist differences statistically significant when we are in the presence of 
firms controlled by individuals. On average, there are 3.74 and 1.58 firms owned by 
individuals on Civil and Common law based countries (t-stat = 2.79). In this case we are in 
the presence of a conflict of interest between minority shareholders and a larger block 
shareholder that simultaneously controls management which tries to expropriate wealth 
from minority shareholders (vd.for example Bebchuk (1999)). But the legal system can´t be 
the panacea for this problem. For example, the economic history of each country must not 
be ignored as we will see further on. 
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In fact, the role of individuals is particularly expressive in emerging countries namely in 
Chile and Turkey.  These economies have suffered recently due to profound changes. In 
Chile, old families (Angelini, Matte and Luksic) that grew during the 20th century based on 
the policy of import substitution, which ended with the trade liberalization carried out 
during 1974-1979, changed from declining manufacturing industries to natural resource 
processing sectors. These groups, contrary to the techniques used in other countries, namely 
in Asia, of cross shareholdings, prohibited by Chilean law, adopted practices based on 
pyramidal structures. In Turkey, an economy predominantly agricultural country inherited 
from the Ottoman empire, there are many individuals (for example, Dogan, Koç and 
Sabanci families) that created truly giant business groups during the previous century, 
particularly after the 60s, period in which the State not also had a decisive weight in the 
economy but has allocated resources to the private sector. As Chilean families the Turkish 
used pyramidal structures to control their businesses. In Sweden, a Social democratic 
country, the Government has adopted measures, the legalization of dual class shares, to 
defend employment, sometimes contrarily to the idea of profit maximization. That was the 
reason why some individuals, namely the old Wallenberg family, control many important 
firms. In Portugal and Spain, on the other hand, the transition to democracy during the 70s 
and the development of their capital markets gave rise to major economic groups with 
family characteristics.  
Even when we compare the importance of Governments on the control of firms, 
considering different legal regimes, we observe the importance of the economic history. 
The results presented in table III do not show any statistical difference between the number 
of firms controlled by Government in countries with different legal regimes (t-stat = -0.51). 
There are 1.84 and 2.33 firms, on average, controlled by Governments respectively in Civil 
and Common law based regimes. However, if we exclude Asian countries, the results 
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change to 1.84 and 0.43 with 5% statistical significance (t- stat = 2.77). It seems that the 
interference of the Government on economy is not similar in all Common law based 
countries.  
In fact, the most common is the largest companies being controlled by managers (widely 
held), or, alternatively, said control is carried out by shareholders with different 
characteristics (miscellaneous, as we defined in section 2.1.1.), but for different reasons. 
The correlation coefficient between the number of firms widely held by country and the 
median market capitalization is 0.64. Thus, when we are in the presence of countries whose 
firms are large (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA (vd. 
Table I) the control is exercised by managers, firms are widely held, and there are conflict 
of interests between managers and shareholders. The simple explanation to understand the 
reasons why a firm is widely held can´t be extended when we are in face of miscellaneous 
ultimate owners. Firstly because there is a correlation of -0.57 between the market 
capitalization of the companies and the number of companies owned by diverse 
shareholders. In fact, this type of corporate ownership exists in small capital markets – 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, Malaysia, and New Zealand – 
where companies, in general, present a small market capitalization. However, the structure 
of corporate ownership is not the same in those countries. While Austrian and Malaysian 
firms are owned by the Government in parallel with other shareholders, in Denmark the 
foundations have an important role in the corporate ownership, in Portugal firms are owned 
by different categories of shareholders (private firms, holdings, financial intermediaries, 
and Government) and in Ireland and in New Zealand there are many financial 
intermediaries controlling a firm. 
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Table IV shows the explanatory factors of different corporate structures, i.e., variables that 
influence firms owned by individuals, by the Government, by different categories of 
shareholders (miscellaneous), as well as widely held firms.  
In panel A is done the analysis for individuals, and it is possible to conclude that market 
capitalization influences negatively such corporate structures, i.e., these companies 
generally present a small size. On the other hand, in line with La Porta et al (1999), these 
corporate structures seem to be more observed in civil law based countries. The explanation 
that appears to be more plausible for this is related with the countries´ economic history. In 
some of them, with smaller companies, the State promoted the delivery of vital sectors of 
its economy to local groups. This is particularly true for many countries, e.g. Chile, 
Portugal and Turkey.  
For companies owned by the Government (panel B), it should be noted that this type of 
financial structure is more visible in countries whose disclosure level is more limited, 
particularly in Greece, India and Thailand. Probably this is a result of these countries 
present a less developed financial system, as well as less transparent and where the State 
wants to continue playing a decisive role in the economy. This class of firm structures is 
more visible in non catholic based countries. Asian countries where Catholic religion is 
poorly disseminated is fundamental for such result. 
In panel C are presented companies whose shareholder structure is diffuse, usually 
characterized by having more than one shareholder, the largest and a smaller, the latter with 
a role in the decisions of the management as a monitor. Usually the monitor is a financial 
intermediary (bank, hedge fund or asset manager), finding out growth firms (glamorous 
stocks) where the role of monitoring is crucial, particularly in terms of investment decisions 
made by the management. This occurs most frequently on banking based countries, and 
probably less on capital market based countries where shareholders are better protected. 
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Such corporate ownership structures are also more frequent on small firms (see panel C) 
where it gets easier to be the second largest shareholder, with a role of monitoring the 
largest one. In fact, asset managers find out glamorous small stocks for their portfolios as a 
way of controlling the investments made by management/largest shareholder.  
Finally regressions for widely held firms are reported in panel D, and the results of 
regressions were expected, market capitalization and economic freedom play an important 
and positive role in that category of firms. Widely held firms present large market 
capitalization and proliferate in an environment where the role of the private sector is 
defended, i.e., in countries characterized by economic freedom, giving the opportunity to be 
created larger capital markets with thousands of shareholders. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This research paper aims to assess the main forces that influence corporate ownership, more 
precisely the determinants of a firm owned by individuals, Government, miscellaneous of 
investors and widely held. 
Firms owned by individuals, Government, miscellaneous investors or widely held, exist under 
different circumstances. While firms owned by individuals are small, proliferate on civil-law 
based countries with low levels of economic freedom, firms owned by Governments multiply 
under low standards of disclosure, emergent financial markets and non-civil-law environments. 
On the other hand, the presence of miscellaneous investors is more frequent when stocks are 
glamorous and small wherein the smaller shareholder can easily use their limited resources and 
monitoring the management/larger shareholder. Finally, widely held firms are large and are 
stimulated by an economic freedom behavior. 
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Table I - Firm – Level Variables 
The median market capitalisation of the 20 largest firms by country, million dollar denominated, is from Worldscope (WS Item, WC07211). 
The median market-to-book of the 20 largest firms by country is also Worldscope. Market-to-book is defined as total assets (Worldscope Item, 
WC 02999) minus book equity - defined as total assets minus total liabilities (WC 03351) and preferred stock (WC 03451) plus deferred taxes 
(WC 03263) and convertible debt (WC 18282) - plus market capitalisation (WC 08001), local currency denominated, divided by total assets. 
The median annualised volatility of the 20 largest firms by country is calculated using Datastream data, dollar denominated, considering 
weekly returns during 2000-2005 
Country Market Capitalisation Market-to-Book Volatility 
  (median) (median) (median) 
Austria 4.077 1,23 0,27 
Belgium 6.896 1,34 0,25 
Chile 2.763 1,24 0,27 
Denmark 4.014 1,51 0,29 
Finland 4.067 1,5 0,31 
France 47.826 1,19 0,29 
Germany 32.799 1,07 0,34 
Greece 4.483 1,38 0,3 
Italy 17.247 1,13 0,28 
Japan 49.882 1,11 0,34 
Netherlands 14.195 1,39 0,34 
Norway 3.125 1,51 0,35 
Portugal 2.360 1,18 0,26 
South Korea 12.919 1,2 0,46 
Spain 16.121 1,31 0,23 
Sweden 13.464 1,36 0,3 
Switzerland 16.367 1,74 0,32 
Taiwan 9.321 1,41 0,35 
Turkey 2.919 1,23 0,56 
Civil Law Countries Average  13.939 1,32 0,32 
Australia 15.219 1,41 0,22 
Canada 28.917 1,35 0,24 
Hong Kong 13.974 1,14 0,3 
India 10.914 1,72 0,41 
Ireland 2.979 1,57 0,27 
Malaysia 4.206 1,22 0,2 
New Zealand 1.084 1,49 0,26 
Singapore 4.108 1,15 0,28 
South Africa 10.106 1,56 0,35 
Thailand 2.814 1,24 0,36 
UK 71.490 1,62 0,26 
USA 155.476 1,93 0,27 
Common  Law Countries Average  26.774 1,45 0,29 
t-stat -0,96 -1,65 1,47 
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Table II – Country – Level Variables 
Disclosure level is from Bhattacharya et al (2003), with higher value indicating more disclosure. The original source is the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). Private credit is from World Bank and is defined by domestic credit provided by 
banking sector % of GDP 2004.The index of economic freedom is from Heritage Foundation and varies from 0 and 100. Religion is from 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-religion-map.htm. 
Panel A: Country-Level Variables 
Country Disclosure Private Economic  Religion 
  Level Credit Freedom   
Austria 59,7 1,23 71,9 Catholic 
Belgium 67,8 1,12 70,2 Catholic 
Chile 72,9 0,7 77,4 Catholic 
Denmark 70,6 1,66 78,6 Prothestant 
Finland 78,2 0,7 74 Prothestant 
France 75,8 1,07 64,6 Catholic 
Germany 66 1,43 71,8 Prothestant 
Greece 59,8 1,05 60,3 Other 
Italy 65,4 1,05 60,3 Catholic 
Japan 70,5 1,55 72,8 Other 
Netherlands 71,4 1,67 74,7 Catholic 
Norway 75,4 0,11 70,3 Prothestant 
Portugal 53,7 1,51 64 Catholic 
South Korea 67,5 1,01 69,8 Other 
Spain 68,2 1,39 70,2 Catholic 
Sweden 82,1 1,13 71,9 Prothestant 
Switzerland 75 1,75 81,9 Catholic 
Taiwan 62,3 1,67 70,8 Other 
Turkey 58,6 0,6 64,2 Other 
Civil Law Countries Average 68,47 1,18 70,5   
Australia 78,9 1 82,5 Prothestant 
Canada 72,5 0,97 80,8 Catholic 
Hong Kong 72 1,49 89,7 Other 
India 54 0,6 54,6 Other 
Ireland 79,1 1,18 78,7 Catholic 
Malaysia 76,4 1,34 66,3 Other 
New Zealand 77 1,21 82,3 Prothestant 
Singapore 76,6 0,8 87,2 Other 
South Africa 75 0,85 62,7 Prothestant 
Thailand 62,5 1,05 64,7 Other 
UK 82,1 1,58 74,5 Prothestant 
USA 73 2,71 77,8 Prothestant 
Common Law Countries Average 73,26 1,23 75,2   
t-student -1,70 -0,28 -1,56   
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Table III - Ultimate Owners – Number of Firms by Country 
This table exhibits the percentage of firms owned by type of ultimate owners, using 20% threshold. Ultimate owners with more than 5% 
of votes are included on the sample. A firm whose ultimate owners own less than 20% is considered widely held at 20% threshold. 
Ultimate owner classification is defined in section 2.1.1 . .*, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 
Country Miscellaneous Individuals Government Widely 
        Held 
Austria 12 2 1 5 
Belgium 10 4 2 4 
Chile 6 9 0 5 
Denmark 11 3 0 6 
Finland 7 1 4 8 
France 2 1 4 13 
Germany 3 4 2 11 
Greece 5 4 5 6 
Italy 7 3 1 9 
Japan 1 0 5 14 
Netherlands 7 2 0 11 
Norway 8 5 4 3 
Portugal 14 5 0 1 
South Korea 6 1 3 10 
Spain 3 5 0 12 
Sweden 10 5 1 4 
Switzerland 5 4 2 9 
Taiwan 6 2 1 11 
Turkey 8 11 0 1 
Civil Law Average 6,89 3,74 1,84 7,53 
Australia 2 0 1 17 
Canada 1 3 0 16 
Hong Kong 8 4 5 3 
India 8 1 7 4 
Ireland 13 0 0 7 
Malaysia 16 4 0 0 
New Zealand 13 1 2 4 
Singapore 4 2 7 7 
South Africa 9 0 0 11 
Thailand 7 1 6 6 
UK 4 0 0 16 
USA 0 3 0 17 
Common Law Average 7,08 1,58 2,33 9,00 
t-student -0,11 2,79*** -0,51 -0,74 
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Table IV – Determinants of Ultimate Owner Class 
The table reports the results of OLS regressions for a sample of 32 countries, considering 20% threshold. The dependent variable is the 
ultimate owner class (1 for a given class and 0 for the remaining): Individuals, Government, miscellaneous and widely held.  Civil 
origin, disclosure, private credit, economic freedom and catholic origin are dummy variables. Disclosure, private credit and economic 
freedom are 1 if above the median. QML Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Huber/White) are reported in parentheses. .*, **, 
and ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 
 
Panel A - Individuals 
Market Capitalization -0,2508 -0.2280 
 
-0.2414 
z-statistic -2.73*** -2.91*** 
 
-2.65*** 
Market-to-Book 0.0438 0.0238 
  z-statistic 0.84 0.49 
  
Volatility -0.2274 0.3909 
  z-statistic -0.27 0.49 
  
Civil Origin -0.9450 
 
-0.8893 -0.8940 
z-statistic -2.97*** 
 
-2.85*** -3.16*** 
Disclosure 0.2608 
 
0,1964 
 z-statistic 0.85 
 
0.65 
 
Private Credit -0.0896 
 
-0,1281 
 z-statistic -0.33 
 
-0.47 
 
Economic Freedom -0,5658 
 
-0,5401 -0.4642 
z-statistic -1.89* 
 
-1.80* -1.96** 
Catholic Origin 0,1800 
 
0,1311 
 z-statistic 0.71 
 
0.54 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0,05 0,01 0,04 0,05 
Nº obs 620 620 620 620 
Panel B - Government 
Market Capitalization 0,1739 0,0407 
  z-statistic 1.41 0.44 
  
Market-to-Book -0.1968 -0.1557 
  z-statistic -1.09 -0.86 
  
Volatility -0.8390 1.1344 
  z-statistic -0.72 1.50 
  
Civil Origin 0.2522 
 
0.2479 
 z-statistic 0,70 
 
0.74 
 
Disclosure -1.0375 
 
-0,9325 -0.5987 
z-statistic -2.37** 
 
-2.15** -2.17** 
Private Credit -1.3580 
 
-1.1950 -1.0027 
z-statistic -4.00*** 
 
-3.94*** -3.44*** 
Economic Freedom 0,3862 
 
0,4599 
 z-statistic 0.98 
 
1.17 
 
Catholic Origin -1.2555 
 
-1.0779 -1.1334 
z-statistic -3.21*** 
 
-2.95*** -3.12*** 
Pseudo R
2
 0,09 0,01 0,08 0,07 
Nº obs 620 620 620 620 
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Panel C - Miscellaneous 
Market Capitalization -0.6046 -0,5802 
 
-0.6019 
z-statistic -8.16*** -8.13*** 
 
-8.12*** 
Market-to-Book 0.0916 0.0938 
 
0.0864 
z-statistic 2.22** 2.38** 
 
2.14** 
Volatility 0.4240 -0.2592 
  z-statistic 0,55 -0.36 
  
Civil Origin 0.0601 
 
0.1988 
 z-statistic 0,27 
 
0.51 
 
Disclosure 0.03253 
 
0.1967 
 z-statistic 1.44 
 
0.92 
 
Private Credit 0.7433  0.5575 0.6629 
z-statistic 2.62***  2.99*** 3.45*** 
Economic Freedom -0.3877 
 
-0.4485 -0.2077 
z-statistic -1.52 
 
-1.64 -1.10 
Catholic Origin 0.2370 
 
0.1349 
 z-statistic 1.14 
 
0.71 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0,09 0,09 0,01 0,11 
Nº obs 620 620 620 620 
 
 
Panel D - Widely Held 
Market Capitalization 0.6605 0,6616 
 
0.6442 
z-statistic 8.66*** 8.71*** 
 
8.49*** 
Market-to-Book -0.0929 -0.0853 
  z-statistic -1.61 -1.57 
  
Volatility -0.1220 -0.4736 
  z-statistic -0.17 -0.70 
  
Civil Origin 0.2056 
 
0.1645 
 z-statistic 0.92 
 
0.83 
 
Disclosure -0.0840 
 
0.0491 
 z-statistic -0.37 
 
0.24 
 
Private Credit -0.2664  -0.0461  
z-statistic -1.36  -0.25  
Economic Freedom 0.5547  0.5820 0.4875 
z-statistic 2.57**  2.89*** 2.72*** 
Catholic Origin 0.0347 
 
0.1219 
 z-statistic 0.17 
 
0.66 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0,13 0,12 0,02 0,12 
Nº obs 620 620 620 620 
 
